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Th is thesis considers an extension of the classical newsvendor model , i n wh ich 
the newsvendor not on ly decides the order quan t i t y b u t also determines the 
str ike quan t i t y or the str ike price of a pu t opt ion. W i t h the p u t opt ion, the 
newsvendor w i l l be compensated by the op t ion wr i te r i f the realized demand 
falls below the str ike quant i ty . We discuss three object ives f r om the newsven-
dor 's prospectives: I ) Max im iza t i on of the expected prof i t ; I I ) Max im iza t i on 
of the p robab i l i t y of achieving a target prof i t ; I I I ) M i n i m i z a t i o n of the prof i t 
variance. The p u t op t i on serves the purpose of reducing the newsvendor's 
prof i t r isk wh ich differs f r om the re tu rn /buy -back contract for supply chain 
coordinat ion. We show tha t i t has no impact on the classical newsvendor's 
expected prof i t , b u t can decrease the prof i t variance. The prof i t variance is 
convex (quasi-convex) i n the str ike pr ice(quant i ty ) . We derive general expres-
sions of the op t ima l solut ions for some scenarios under Object ives I I & I I I 
and analyze numer ica l ly to y ie ld managerial insights. Our research provides 
a bet ter understanding on the newsvendor's r isk prof i le i n the presence of 
the pu t opt ion. 
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I n recent years, short product life cycle and h igh product variety are the 
characteristics and results of the economic global izat ion and technological 
development. F i rms need to develop the capabi l i ty of responding quickly to 
the changing market i n order to compete effectively. F i rms also face h igh r isk 
of uncertain re tu rn i n the highly unpredictable market. Obviously, different 
firms have different r isk att i tudes. As noted by Tsay (2001):" F i rms w i t h 
greater dep th /b read th of assets and activit ies tend to be less concerned w i t h 
uncertainty. B u t the undeniable message is tha t f i rms do care about risk, 
and different f i rms may care about to dif fer ing extent." 
Consider the fol lowing risk management case of Enron (Zellner, Palmeri, 
Coy and Cohn, 2001): 
A small clothing cataloger asks Enron to create a derivative to protect 
against hot weather that might hurt sales of winter clothes. For every de-
gree above normal over some period, Enron must pay the retailer a certain 
amount; for every degree below, the retailer pays Enron. Enron lays off its 
risk through a deal with a soft drink maker who benefits from hot weather. 
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Though Enron went bankrup t last year, th is innovative f inancial- l ike in-
s t rument among others tha t En ron had created might have cont r ibuted its 
b o t t o m line. Th is story reveals at least two insights. F i rs t , i t is possible for 
non-f inancial f i rms to diversify r isk th rough selling different options. Second, 
there are companies w i l l i ng to acquire options. 
Enron's story motives us to consider the fol lowing model 一 a risk-averse^ 
newsvendor who wants to confine her downward r isk by buy ing pu t options^ 
f r om an opt ion wr i ter . The pu t opt ion gives the buyer " the r ight bu t not 
the obl igat ion" to sell a un i t of product at a given price on a future date. I n 
our single-period model, the purchase order is made before a sell ing season 
begins bu t the actual demand is realized dur ing the selling season. Therefore, 
at the beginning the newsvendor orders a certain quant i ty of products f rom 
the supplier, at the same t ime, she can purchase a certain quant i ty of pu t 
options f rom the opt ion wr i ter . We assume the supplier of the product can 
be the opt ion wr i ter as well. A t the end of the selling season, the newsvendor 
can c la im compensation f rom the opt ion wr i ter at a prefixed strike price i f 
the actual demand falls below the strike quanti ty, jus t as “sell ing the stock 
back to the opt ion wr i te r " in the financial market. 
Using the stylized newsvendor model as a framework, the pr imary objec-
t ive of this thesis is to address the value of the put opt ion to the newsvendor 
on hedging the prof i t r isk. We consider main ly two situations: (1) The strike 
price is set by the opt ion wr i ter ; (2) The newsvendor is able to fix the strike 
price before making quant i ty decision. Based on these two situations, we 
discuss three objectives to the newsvendor: 
1 "Risk-averse" in this thesis means "dislike uncertain return very much". 
2 "Put option" and "option" share the same meaning in this thesis. 
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• O b ject ive I : Max im iz ing the expected prof i t by op t ima l ly deciding the 
order quant i ty and the str ike quant i ty ; 
• O b ject ive I I : Max imiz ing the probabi l i ty of achieving a target prof i t ; 
• O b ject ive I I I : M in im iz i ng the prof i t variance by opt imal ly choosing the 
str ike price or the str ike quant i ty, whi le mainta in ing the expected prof i t 
at the same level as in the classical news vendor model. 
The ma in reason for us to consider Object ive I is tha t i t can be di rect ly 
compared w i t h the classical newsvendor setting. I n the analysis of Objec-
t ive I , i t is interesting to find tha t the put opt ion has no influence on the 
newsvendor's expected prof i t . T h a t is, regardless of the strike quant i ty and 
price, the newsvendor's expected prof i t is the same as tha t i n the classical 
newsvendor sett ing w i thou t any options. Lau (1980a) suggests tha t i t is often 
inappropr iate to consider only the maximizat ion of the expected prof i t of the 
newsvendor when payoffs are stochastic. Since even i f the decision is made 
on the op t ima l solut ion of max imiz ing expected prof i t , the actual result may 
not reach the desired prof i t level. However, the actual prof i t w i l l be bounded 
f rom below w i t h the option. 
I n order to fu l ly explore the value of the opt ion to the newsvendor, we 
consider the option's impact on the newsvendor's risk profile. Noted by 
Kabak & Schiff (1978), empir ical work suggests tha t management's at tent ion 
is focused on at ta in ing budgeted levels of income. Therefore, in Object ive 
I I we consider the probabi l i ty of achieving a budgeted re turn by opt imal ly 
determined the order/str ike quanti ty. 
Since the expected prof i t is affected by neither the strike price nor the 
strike quantity, there is no "mean-variance" tradeoff in our model • The 
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analysis on prof i t variance i n re lat ion w i t h the str ike price and the str ike 
quant i t y demonstrates a convexity/quasi-convexity proposit ion. Employ ing 
the prof i t variance as the news vendor's r isk measurement, we seek to reduce 
the newsvendor's r isk th rough quant i ty and pr ic ing decision opt imizat ion i n 
Object ive I I I . 
Justif ication of the Research 
Fi rs t of all, the "newsvendor" can be regarded as a smal l retailer who sells 
one or more of the consumer goods, such as apparel, skiwear, toys, shoes, 
electronics categories, candy and books, which have short product life cycles 
and h igh product varieties. These factors result in h igh demand uncertainty 
and h igh prof i t variance and might br ing cash-flow crisis to such a retailer. 
We expect the retailer of this k ind to be more r isk averse due to her relevant 
weak capacities than the large integrated/chain retailer. I n th is thesis, we 
t r y to analyze the benefit of the opt ion, seeing how does i t "protect" the 
news vendor f rom high prof i t variance. 
Second, the previous researches on the r isk a t t i tude issue in the newsven-
dor's perspectives focus main ly on studying different u t i l i t y functions, either 
th rough direct maximizat ion or mean-variance analysis. Relevant models can 
be referred to Khouja 's (1999) survey paper. We deliberately avoid model l ing 
any specific risk-averse att i tudes of the news vendor, i.e., not using any u t i l i t y 
functions. We believe tha t apply ing u t i l i t y functions w i l l severely l im i t the 
generality of the analyt ical result, because u t i l i t y functions are ind iv idual 
dependent. 
Th i rd , in the last few years, researches on the supply chain coordina-
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t i on have been grown explosively. Generally, they assume tha t bo th parties 
- s u p p l i e r and buyer share the same type of object ive of max imiz ing the 
expected prof i t . Various coordinat ion mechanisms have been constructed 
to accomplish global system objectives (Sahin & Robinson, 2002), such as 
price coordinat ion, revenue sharing and quant i ty discounts, buy-back / re tu rn 
policy, quant i ty f lex ib i l i ty and al locat ion rules. B y def ini t ion, coordinat ion 
means tha t the to ta l prof i ts of a decentralized supply chain equals tha t of a 
centralized one, and assume r isk-neutral i ty of a l l decision makers. However, 
i f players in a supply chain have different r isk at t i tudes, then the def in i t ion 
of supply chain coord inat ion is problematic. Therefore, our emphasis is only 
on the retai ler rather t han the whole supply chain. 
We assume tha t the t ranspor ta t ion t ime is t r i v i a l compared w i t h the 
selling dura t ion and manufactur ing cycle t ime. The newsvendor can ask the 
opt ion wr i ter to ship the goods whenever needed. Therefore, the unsold 
goods need not to be physically returned/shipped to the opt ion wr i ter . 
Comparison wi th Return/Buy-back Policy 
Noteworthy, the pu t opt ion we investigate resembles one k ind of supply chain 
coordinat ion mechanism — return/buy-back pol icy i n some extent. Defined by 
Sahin & Robinson (2002): “ A buy-back contract allows a retailer to re turn 
any por t ion of his in i t ia l order at a pre-specified price. I t can coordinate 
pr ic ing and quant i ty decision". The decision structure of the " re turn port ion" 
and “ pre-specified price" represents relative strategic power in the channel 
which can be established using concepts f rom game theory once a decision 
structure is assumed. Nearly every analysis of re turn/buy-back or similar 
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policies assumes the manufacturer (supplier) to be the channel captain. 
The basic incentive for the supplier to offer the re tu rn /buy-back price is 
to encourage the retailer to order more. Whi le i n real-world applications, 
a larger order quant i ty w i l l generate a larger cash flow need for the retailer 
wh ich might br ing cash crisis. Moreover, the pr ic ing and quant i t y decisions 
are made under the object ive of maximiz ing the entire supply chain - the 
supplier and the retailer's jo in t expected prof i t . A manufacturer who takes 
Stackelberg leadership i n a game may ignore smal l retailers' r isk at t i tudes 
i n deciding the policy. Therefore, such an objective can not guard the small 
retailers against low prof i t probabi l i ty. 
Some re turn policies can y ie ld some reduct ion in prof i t uncerta inty given 
the news vendor is w i l l ing to sacrifice a amount of the expected prof i t . Choi, L i 
& Yan (2002) numerical ly s tudy such re turn pol icy th rough mean-variance 
analysis. The put opt ion we proposed has no such "compromising" side-
effect. Instead, i t reduces the prof i t variance directly. Furthermore, this 
scheme can be applied to the industries where the re turn /buy-back policies 
are popular, such as electronics, publ ishing, musical CDs, medical, snacks 
food and some other direct materials providers w i t h which the returned ma-
terials can be resold to others according to the investigation of Choi, et al. 
(2002). 
Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis are organized as follows: 
• C h apter 2: We define the opt ion pr ic ing mechanism using the sett ing 
in finance, and outl ine notat ions and modell ing assumptions. 
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• C h apter 3: W i t h the basic setup ready, we review several extensions of 
the classical news vendor model and compare them w i t h our model. 
• C h apter 4: We examine Object ive I of max imiz ing the expected prof i t 
w i t h the order quant i ty and the str ike quant i ty as decision variables. 
I t yields an interest ing result tha t the opt ion has no impact on the 
newsvendor's expected prof i t . 
• C h apter 5: We consider Object ive I I of max imiz ing the probabi l i ty 
of achieving a target prof i t level th rough opt imal ly deciding the str ike 
quant i ty. Due to the complexity, our s tudy is confined to the s i tuat ion 
where the strike quant i ty equals the order quanti ty. 
• C h apter 6: We analyze Object ive I I I of m in imiz ing the newsvendor's 
prof i t variance by opt imal ly deciding the strike price and the strike 
quant i ty, where the order quant i ty is f ixed at the level tha t maximizes 
the expected prof i t . 
I n bo th Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we also conduct numerical analysis 
to examine the comparative-static effects of changes in the various cost 
and price parameters and gain some insights. 




Notation and Model 
The newsvendor problem, also known as the news-boy prob lem or the single-
per iod prob lem (SPP), has at t racted increasing interest i n the last decade. 
The newsvendor model derives i ts name f rom a problem encountered by a 
vendor of newspaper, who faces a random demand and must decide at the 
beginning of the day how much newspaper to stock. Due to the lead t ime 
for p r in t ing and d is t r ibut ion, there is no oppor tun i ty to reorder newspaper 
dur ing the day. Since unsold newspaper has l i t t le value at the day's end, 
the retailer has a mot ive not to stock too much. O n the other hand, hav-
ing stock on hand is necessary to satisfy customer and earn prof i t . The 
prof i t -maximizat ion strategy strikes a balance between the penalty for over-
stocking and under-stocking, tak ing into account the relative l ikel ihood of 
each circumstance. The classical newsvendor problem is to find an op t ima l 
order quant i ty t ha t maximizes the expected prof i t under uncertain demand. 
We extend the single-period stylized newsvendor model by in t roducing a 
put opt ion in to i t . There are two parties in the system: the newsvendor and 
the opt ion wr i ter . We assume the opt ion pr ic ing mechanism is accepted by 
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b o t h parties at the beginning. The newsvendor needs to decide whether to 
purchase the opt ions f rom the opt ion wr i ter and how many at what price. 
I n one case, the str ike price is pre-determined by the opt ion wr i ter . I f the 
newsvendor accepts the opt ion price, she needs to make op t ima l decision on 
bo th the order quant i ty and strike quanti ty. I n the other case, the newsven-
dor owns the r ight to fix the strike price before mak ing purchasing decision. 
I n bo th cases, i f the realized demand falls below the strike quant i ty level, 
the newsvendor w i l l be compensated by the opt ion wr i ter at the strike price. 
The issue of how to deal w i t h the unsold products, such as t ranshipment, 
re-selling, and so on, is beyond the scope of our research. 
Since the opt ion wr i ter sells more than one k ind of commodity, she can 
make prof i t by t rad ing in different markets under different condit ions. For 
instance, she may sell the options of winter clothes and beverages at the same 
t ime as Enron (Zellner, et al., 2001) did. I n the demand realizing season, 
i f the weather turns out to be warm, the opt ion wr i ter then needs to pay 
compensation to the retailer of winter clothes. However, at the same t ime, 
the beverage sales w i l l go well, f rom which the opt ion wr i ter makes prof i t . 
The wr i ter is thus assumed to be risk-neutral. 
2.1 Notat ion 
Throughout the thesis, we w i l l use the fol lowing notat ions for al l the models: 
X 二 Demand, x is the value of the random variable w i t h p.d.f. f { x ) k 
c.d.f. F{x). 
s 二 Newsvendor's un i t selling price, 
c = Un i t product cost. 
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V — U n i t salvage value. 
b = U n i t goodwi l l lost /shortage cost. 
Q = Order quant i ty, decision variable. 
Q* = O p t i m a l order quant i ty to maximize the newsvendor's expected 
prof i t . 
Q** 二 Satisfying order quant i ty to maximize the probabi l i ty of achieving 
a target prof i t . 
K = Strike quanti ty, decision variable. 
K* 二 O p t i m a l strike quant i ty to min imize the newsvendor's prof i t vari-
ance. 
R -- Strike price, decision variable. 
R* 二 Op t ima l strike price to min imize the newsvendor's prof i t variance. 
p{K, R) = Op t ion price. 
TT 二 Newsvendor's prof i t . 
E[Il{x,Q)] 二 Expected prof i t w i thou t any options (use ^[11] to s impl i fy 
notat ion) . 
Q, R)] 二 Expected prof i t w i t h the put opt ion when K = Q. 
Q,R)] = Expected prof i t w i t h the put opt ion when K < Q 
(we use E[7t^] to s impl i fy notat ion). 
Var[U{x, Q)] - Prof i t variance w i thou t any options (use Var[Il] to sim-
p l i f y notat ion). 
Var[Il^{x,Q,R)] 二 Prof i t variance w i t h the put opt ion when K = Q. 
Var\U.^{x, K,Q,R)\ = Prof i t variance w i t h the put opt ion when K <Q 
(use V a r [ n ^ ] as simplif ied notat ion). 
l i t 二 Target prof i t level. 
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PB = Probabi l i ty of achieving a target prof i t tt^. 
We assume bo th parties have the same complete informat ion of the cost 
and the demand distr ibut ion. Un i t selling price s is exogenously determined 
and known. Un i t product cost c is the purchasing price of the newsvendor. 
Un i t salvage value v is supposed to be the same for bo th parties. The rela-
t i o n s h i p o f t h e costs: unit selling price > unit product cost > unit salvage 
value is quite straightforward. A n d the relationship of c < R < s is supposed 
to hold in order to at t ract the small retailers to purchase the put options. 
2.2 Classical Newsvendor Model 
The prof i t in the classical newsvendor model can be expressed as: 
f sx + v(Q-x) -cQ i f X < 0 ; 
[sQ 一 h{x -Q)-cQ i i x > Q . 
Taking the expectation yields the expected prof i t : 
noo roo 
E[U{x,Q)] 二 (s + v — c) Qf{x)dx -b xf(x)d{x) 
JQ JQ 
rQ rQ 
+{s-v) / xf{x)dx -^{v-c) / Qf{x)dx 
Jo Jo 
rQ 广 
+ / (s - v)xf{x)dx - / bxf{x)dx. (2.1) 
Jo JQ 
The classical newsvendor problem is defined as: 
max Q). 
Q 
Using Leibniz's rule to obtain the first and second order derivatives: 
气n ] 〉 0 shows that 五 [nl is concave. The sufficient opt imal i ty condit ion 
dQ2 ， L J 
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is the wel l -known fract i le formula: 
聊 = ( 2 . 2 ) 
s + b — V 
or 
F m = (2-3) 
s -\-b — V 
2.3 The Price of the Pu t Opt ion 
The strike price R i n the context of the newsvendor problem is the number of 
dollars the opt ion wr i ter would pay the newsvendor for each un i t of surplus. 
One un i t of op t ion is corresponding to one un i t of product . The newsvendor 
can order Q uni ts of products and purchase K uni ts of options w i t h the 
relat ionship tha t K < Q. We define those K uni ts of products under the 
protect ion of the opt ion as “option products''. I n a word, the strike quant i ty 
K is some level such tha t i f the demand falls below i t the wr i ter pays the 
newsvdendor the strike price for each unsold un i t . 
We assume tha t the opt ion pr ic ing method is accepted by bo th parties in 
the supply chain. Suppose at the end of the selling season, i.e., the expirat ion 
date of the opt ion, the actual demand is x. I f x > K, then the newsvendor 
w i l l not excise the opt ion since she sells out al l the "opt ion products" • I f 
K > X, the newsvendor can get compensation for the unsold (K — x) units 
of products at the pre-agreed strike price R. Different f rom the opt ion in 
a f inancial context, whether the newsvendor excising the opt ion depends 
on the actual demand, not the selling price. The salvage value is assumed 
to be identical to bo th sides, the cost of the unsold products ( i f any) is 
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{R - v){K - x). Therefore, the pay-off of the opt ion is given by: 
pay-off = {R — v)max{K — x, 0). 
Since the dura t ion of the sell ing season is short, the effect of t ime can be 
neglected. Accordingly, the price of the opt ion is: 
fK 
p{K, R) = (R-v) / {K - x)f{x)dx 
Jo 
CK 
= { R - v ) / F{x)dx (2.4) 
Jo 
= { R - v ) I { K ) , 
where I { K ) 二 J^ F{x)dx and R) can be computed using "par t ia l mo-
ment" proposed by Lau (1980a). 
2.4 Extended Models with the Opt ion 
We extend the classical newsvendor model by in t roducing a put opt ion. The 
prof i t functions can be expressed i n two cases: 
•S ing le decision variable case when K = Q, and 
• T w o decision variable case when K < Q. 
Case I： K = Q 
I t is easily seen tha t the newsvendor's prof i t w i t h the opt ion can be expressed 
as: 
^ f sx + R{Q-x)-cQ-p{K,R) if x < Q-
[sQ — b{x - Q ) - cQ-p{K,R) i i x > Q ; 
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where p{K, R) is defined by eqn. (2.4). 
W h e n the actual demand is less t han the order quant i ty, i.e., the str ike 
quant i ty , the newsvendor w i l l get compensation f rom the opt ion wr i te r at 
the str ike price. I f the demand exceeds the order quant i ty, i t occurs goodwi l l 
loss. Inc lud ing th is cost is to make the model more general. To include or not 
the shortage cost is a controversial issue i n the newsvendor model. I n some 
industr ies, such as fashion, frequent shortage of seasonal products can create 
a posit ive image tha t the products are "hot " sales and encourage customers 
to revisi t the newsvendor. 
Case II: K <Q 
W h e n K is any quant i ty less than or equal to Q, i.e., K <Q, there w i l l be 
two decision variables. We refine the prof i t funct ion as: 
f + R{K - x) + v{Q - K ) - c Q - p{K, R) i f x < K ; 
ttK 二 sx-^v{Q-x)-cQ-p{K, R) if K < x < Q-
sQ — - Q ) - cQ-p{K, R) i f 〉 Q ; 
(2.6) 
where p{K, R) is defined by eqn. (2.4). 
I n the two decision variable case, if x < K, then the newsvendor needs 
to salvage parts of the unsold products (Q - K) tha t were not hedged; when 
K < X < Q, the newsvendor needs to salvage only (Q - x) by herself; when 
x > Q, like Case I, there w i l l be goodwi l l loss. 
We have chosen not to use any expl ic i t u t i l i t y functions in our analysis. 
Instead, we w i l l examine three objectives to the newsvendor based on the 
above models: 
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• O b ject ive I : Max im iz i ng the expected prof i t by op t ima l l y determin ing 
the order quan t i t y and the str ike quant i ty ; 
• O b ject ive I I : Max im iz i ng the probabi l i ty of achieving a target prof i t by 
op t ima l l y deciding the order quant i ty and the str ike quant i ty ; 
• O b ject ive I I I : M i n i m i z i n g the prof i t variance by op t ima l l y choosing 
the str ike quan t i t y and str ike price of the opt ion, whi le mainta in ing 
the expected prof i t at the level as i n the classical newsvendor model. 
We choose Object ive I because tha t i t can be compared di rect ly w i t h 
the classical newsvendor model. Our intension is to see the impact of the 
op t ion on the expected prof i t . Object ive I I is used because of the reason 
ment ioned i n the In t roduct ion . The opt ion has no impact on the expected 
prof i t , therefore the commonly used method for evaluat ing the r isk-return 
tradeoff — mean-variance analysis is not suitable for our study. Because we 
need not to sacrifice any re tu rn for lower variance. 
To understand our contr ibut ion, i t is useful to first i l lustrate what have 
been accomplished in the l i teratures in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
Khou ja (1999) classifies the extensions of the newsvendor problem into 11 
categories. Our research work on single-period, price-independent stochastic 
demand model fits i n the category of different objectives and u t i l i t y functions. 
A p ic tor ia l i l lus t ra t ion of the relevant extensions is depicted i n Figure 3.1. 
The classical newsvendor problem is to find an order quant i ty tha t max-
imizes the expected prof i t under uncertain demand. Basically, there are two 
approaches to solve this problem: 1) Max imiz ing the expected prof i t ; 2) M in -
imiz ing the expected overage and underage costs. Bo th methods yield the 
same results. We use the f irst approach throughout our study. 
Extensions of Classical Model 
Back to decades' ago, Lau (1980a) had suggested that " i t is often inappropri-
ate to consider only the maximizat ion of the expected prof i t of newsvendor 
when returns are stochastic". Other authors, e.g., Rud i and Pyke (2000) 
point out tha t maximizat ion of E[U] may not reflect real i ty and may not re-
16 
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Nevsvendor Mode l k I ts Extensions 
/ \ 
Price-dependent Demand Price-independent Demand 
/ \ 
Risk-netural Risk-averse 々 
Max im iz ing E [ n ] Max imiz ing Pb / \ \ 
/ \ \ M in im iz i ng V a r [ n 
Mean-vaiance Analysis \ \ 
\ Max imiz ing E [U 
Max imiz ing E [ n ] w i t h Downside Risk Constr iant 
Figure 3.1: A n i l lus t ra t ion of related newsvendor extensions 
suit i n the desired actual prof i t level. Therefore, to fu l ly explore the newsven-
dor model and reflect real-life applications, the l i terature have covered several 
al ternat ive objectives. They are summarized as follows: i : 
1. Max imiz ing the probabi l i ty of achieving a target prof i t l i t . 
2. Max imiz ing the desired level of prof i t , given a target level of probabi l i ty 
(A) of i ts being achieved. 
3. Max imiz ing the expected prof i t , given the probabi l i ty of the prof i t being 
equal to or less than a target prof i t level is less than a given value p. 
4. Max imiz ing the expected ut i l i t ies. 
lEach of the objective is corresponding to a problem to be discussed in the subsequence. 
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K a b a k and Schiff (1978) i n an empir ica l work suggest t ha t management's 
a t ten t ion is focused on a t ta in ing a budgeted level of returns, decision makers 
tend t o max imize the probab i l i t y of achieving a target prof i t object ive wh ich 
is the base for performance evaluation. Such probab i l i t y is denoted as Pb, 
P ( l ) max Ps(7r > 恥 
where l i t is the target prof i t level. 
Kabak and Schiff (1978) derive a closed-form solut ion for the exponent ial 
d is t r ibu ted demand case and a general expression of solut ion for P ( l ) . 
The c o s t - vo lum^pro f i t ( C V P ) analysis is another approach to study the 
newsvendor problem. I n accounting l i terature, C V P analysis tries to maxi -
mize the t o t a l pro f i t by op t ima l l y deciding the sell ing volume and cost based 
on the fo l lowing expression: 
Total Profit = Sale Volumex (Unit Selling Price - Unit Variable Cost) - Fixed Cost. 
"Sell ing volume" is the actual demand in the newsvendor problem. Magee 
(1975) considers the s i tuat ion of w i thou t the shortage penal ty when there is 
unsatisfied demand. Ismai l and Louderback (1979) extend i t by considering 
the shortage penalty, i.e., 6 > 0. They suggest using the objective of maxi-
miz ing Pb to t reat the r isk-return tradeoff, and give an i terat ion procedure 
to determine Q**. 
Lau (1980a) extends Ismail-Louderback's (1979) research w i t h simpler 
analyt ical solut ion procedures to determine Q** and two methods to compute 
丑[n] for any given demand value. Lau (1980a) f i rst rewrites the expression 
of E[Ii] as: 
_ fQ 
E[U] 二 (s + 6 — c)QF{Q) — bE[X] + {s + b-v) j。xf{x)dx. (3.1) 
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One way is to use Winke r , Roodman and Br i tney 's (1972) method of com-
p u t i n g f ^ x f ( x ) d x , wh ich is called "par t ia l moment" t o calculate E[U]. Es-
pecially, when demand is normal ly d is t r ibuted, 
[Q xf{x)dx 二 —af(z) + M 屯⑷， (3.2) 
Jo 
where z = ^ ^ ^ and / ( . ) and $ ( . ) are p.d.f. and c.d.f., respectively, of the 
standard normal variate. The other is to use the method of evaluat ing the 
"un i t normal loss i n teg ra te " - (Q — x)f{x)dx to compute E[7r'. 
Nor land (1980) refines the result of Ismail-Louderback's (1979) stochastic 
C V P model, and derives an analyt ica l expression: 
s — c 
for a normal d is t r ibuted demand case w i thou t goodwi l l loss. 
Ismai l and Louderback (1979) propose another object ive (P (2 ) ) and solve 
i t by i terat ions: 
P (2 ) max Ut, 
s.t. Prob(nt) > \ 
where A is the aspirat ion cr i ter ion of a target probabi l i ty to achieve the 
desired level of prof i t . P (2 ) is a close var iat ion of P ( l ) . Managers need to 
balance between the higher probabi l i ty of achieving satisfactory profi ts and 
the max imum profi ts at satisfactory levels of probabi l i ty. 
Gan, Sethi and Yan (2003) consider a newsvendor w i t h downside r isk con-
straint . They define the downside r isk of the newsvendor as the probabi l i ty 
t ha t her realized prof i t is less than or equal to her target prof i t : 
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B y add ing th i s const ra in t t o the classical newsvendor model , Gan, et al. 
(2003) propose a new decision p rob lem for a risk-averse newsvendor, speci-
f y i n g t h a t the downside r isk no t exceeding a specified f3\ 
P ( 3 ) m a x 五[n], 
“ Q 
s.t. P{7V < n,) < 13, 
the i r emphasis, however, is on the supp ly chain coord inat ion. 
Measurements of the newsvendor's r isk i n the l i te ra ture include: (1) Pro f i t 
var iance / dev ia t ion ; (2) R isk a t t i t ude magni tude; (3) Covariance of pro f i t 
w i t h the r e t u r n on a market por t fo l io of securities. U t i l i t y funct ions usual ly 
are composed w i t h the measurements (1) & ⑵ . 
L a u (1980b) studies two k inds of u t i l i t y funct ions of the extended newsven-
dor prob lem: (1) The expected u t i l i t y func t ion of U(Jl) = E[U] — ka[U 
(_P(4))’ where k is magni tude ref lect ing the newsvendor's degree of r isk aver-
sion; (2)Neuniann -Morgenstern u t i l i t y ; and solves b o t h numerical ly. 
To consider the t radeoff between the expected prof i t and i ts s tandard de-
v ia t ion / var iance is a popular approach to account for the undesirable uncer-
t a i n t y i n the prof i t . Th is systematic t radeof f analysis between an expected re-
t u r n c r i te r ion and a specific r isk measure was first in t roduced by Markowi tz ' s 
( 1959) mean-var iance analysis. Recent years, th is s tandard analysis too l i n 
por t fo l io management has been appl ied to the f ield of operat ional p lann ing 
models under uncertainty. 
Chen and Federgruen (2000) re-visi t several basic inventory models, ex-
h i b i t i ng how a systematic mean-variance tradeoff analysis can be carr ied effi-
ciently, and how the resul t ing inventory strategies differ f rom those obta ined 
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i n the s tandard analysis. 
Agrawa l and Sechadri (2000) consider a risk-averse (prudent) newsven-
dor's p r ic ing strategy under price-dependent demand dist r ibut ions. I n com-
par ison w i t h a r isk-neutra l newsvendor, a risk-averse newsvendor's pr ic ing 
strategies a im ing at max imiz ing the expected ut i l i t ies depend on the forms 
of demand models. 
Noteworthy, Ismai l and Louderback (1979) suggest tha t when there are 
shortage penalt ies, prof i ts w i l l not necessarily conform to any well-defined 
d i s t r i bu t ion funct ions. The shape and locat ion of the prof i t p robab i l i ty func-
t i on depends on the relat ive magnitudes of a l l variables, inc lud ing the order 
quant i ty . Therefore the prof i t variance does not seem to be a useful r isk 
measure as the prof i t d is t r ibu t ion is most l ikely h igh ly skewed. They c la im 
tha t mean-variance analysis is inappropriate. 
Magee (1975) suggests tha t the t rue measure of r isk for the newsvendor 
is not the prof i t variance bu t the covariance of prof i t w i t h the re tu rn on a 
market por t fo l io of securities. Magee (1975) employs the capital-asset pr ic ing 
model ( C A P M ) to solve the newsvendor problem. Anvar i (1987), Thorstenon 
(1989) and Chung (1990) extend the study. 
The return /buy-back pol icy is close to the pu t opt ion in the mechanism, 
bu t differs i n the purpose. Nearly al l the current l i teratures take the man-
ufacturer as the channel captain to offer re turn /buy-back policy. I n order 
to coordinate the supply chain, such contract enables the retailer to re turn 
up to a f ract ion 0 of the or iginal order for a per-uni t rebate of r at the end 
of sell ing season. A re turn pol icy usually can be uniquely defined by a set 
of values for (6>,c,r). The re turn f ract ion 6Q and the re tu rn credit r are 
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corresponding to the strike quant i ty K and the strike price R in our model, 
respectively. A fu l l re tu rn (没=l)offer resembles the case K 二 Q, and the fu l l 
re turn credit is achieved when r = c since r < c is the precondit ion that the 
manufacturer offers the re turn contract. 
Tsay (2001) summarizes a decision sequence employed by a manufacturer 
who takes Stackelberg leadership in a game: (i) The manufacturer dictates 
(6>’ c, r ) , (i i) The retailer decides whether to carry the product and the order 
quant i ty Q (as well as the selling price, i f s is a decision variable). Based 
on this strategy, once the manufacturer fixes {6, c, r ) , the retailer chooses the 
opt imal order quant i ty tha t maximizes the expected prof i t in eqn. (3.3): 
r{l-e)Q 
ElUreturn] = —Qc + [sX + OQv + {{1 - e)Q - x)v] f {x)dx 
Jo 
rQ 
+ / [5X + {Q - x)r]f{x)dx 
p OO 
+ / [sQ - {x - Q)b]f{x)dx (3.3) 
JQ 
Wi thou t considering the shipping cost for return, when the retailer's sal-
vage value Vr is less than or equal to that of the manufacturer v ^ , the op-
t ima l return policy is fu l l return = 1). The opt imal Q;eturn ⑴ maximize 
E ripefJ/rn IS. 
o* , = 广 i ( ' s + “ c ) (3.4) 
‘turn + 乂 
o* > o* 二 since r > v. This result reflects the incentive 
^ return z s； 、sib—v 厂 
of the return policy to increase the retailer's order quantity. 
We consider a special case of ful l credit (r 二 c) ful l return 二 1) which 
is the best case on the retailer's perspective under such k ind of return policy. 
When the actual demand is zero 工二 0，the retailer's profit E[Ureturn] 二 〇. 
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Choi, et al. (2002) apply the mean-variance analysis of the re tu rn pol icy 
wh ich reduces the prof i t variance th rough compromising an amount of the 
expected prof i t . I n our model, the newsvendor w i l l pay for the options, 
resul t ing i n a constant expected prof i t and a greatly decreased prof i t variance. 
Burnetas and Ri tchken (2002) investigate the opt ion pr ic ing when the 
demand curve is downward sloping, where a manufacturer offers the retailer 
a r ight to reorder (call opt ion) and /o r a r ight to re turn unsold goods for a 
predetermined salvage value (put opt ion) . They set the objective to maximize 
the manufacturers' net present value, and conclude tha t retai ler w i l l either 
benefit f rom or worst off w i t h the options in te rm of the net present value. 
Di f fer ing f rom Burnetas and Ritchken's (2002) research, the pu t opt ion 
t ha t we consider is provided by a r isk-neutral opt ion wr i ter who can diversify 
risks by sell ing hedging options l ike Enron did. The option's pr ic ing mecha-
n ism is accepted by bo th parties bu t depends on strike price and the strike 
quant i ty. We only consider the decision making of the newsvendor. 
We believe the prof i t variance is a main factor for those smal l retailers 
i n mak ing decisions, thus a simple bu t valuable r isk measurement. Besides 
the objective of maximiz ing the expected prof i t (Objective I ) , we consider 
the maximizat ion of PB (Object ive I I ) using general demand d is t r ibu t ion to 
analyze four cases different in the way we treat b and R. Due to the unique 
effect of the opt ion on the expected prof i t , we minimize the prof i t variance 
by opt imal ly choosing R and K (Object ive I I I ) , an objective which has not 
yet been covered in the current l i teratures, instead of using mean-variance 
analysis or u t i l i t y function. These three objectives w i l l be analyzed in details 
in the fol lowing three chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Objective I — Maximizing 
Expected Profit 
I n this chapter, we study the impact of options on the newsvendor's expected 





4.1 Single Decision Variable Case: K = Q 
We start w i t h the simple case K = Q, meaning that the strike quant i ty 
equals the order quantity. Re-arranging the prof i t eqn. (2.5) yields: 
‘(s-R)x + Q(R-c)-p(K, R) ifx<Q] 
[-bx + {s-c + b)Q-p(K, R) i f x > Q . 
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Tak ing expectat ion we have: 
rQ fQ 
= Q{R- c)f(x)dx -〔R-v) {Q- x)f{x)dx 
rQ r⑴ 
+ / (s - R)xf{x)dx + / [{s-c + b)Q-bx]f{x)dx 
Jo JQ 
二 [Q [Q{R - c) — Q{R - v)]f{x)dx + ( 5 - c + b)Q[l - F{Q)] 
Jo 
rQ 




+ / (5 - v)xf{x)dx - / bxf{x)dx; (4.1) 
Jo JQ 
E[U^{x,Q,R)] is the same as E[U{x,Q% see eqn. (2.1). 
4.2 Two Decision Variable Case: K <Q 
Now consider the more general case K < Q. Effectively, there are two 
decision variables, we refine eqn. (2.6) to be: 
,(5 - R)x + c)Q + v)K - p{K, R) ii x < K-
= {s - v)x ^ {v - c)Q - p{K, R) i f K < x < Q ] 
-bx-{-{s-c-^b)Q-p(K, R) i f x > Q . 
(4.2) 
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Tak ing expectat ion of eqn. (4.2) yields: 
= r {s- R)xf{x)dx + [{v - c)Q + {R- v ) K ] F { K ) 
Jo 
+ / (s — v)xf{x)dx ^ { v - c)Q[F{Q) - F{K)] 
JK 
poo 
-b / xf{x)dx + (s — c + -（s - c + b)QF{Q) 
JQ 
fK 
- / {R-v){K - x ) f { x ) d x 
Jo 
二 F(K) [ 0 - c ) g + ( i^ - v)K - ( v - c)Q - { R - v)K] 
rQ 
+ / (s - v)xf{x)dx + F{Q)Q{v - b - s ) 
JK 
+ [ {s- v)xf{x)dx - b [ xf{x)dx + (s - c + 
Jo JQ 
= [ s - c^h)Q + F{Q)Q(y - h - s) 
[ Q (s - v)xf{x)dx - b f xf{x)dx. (4.3) 
Jo JQ 
I n eqn. (4.3) we can see tha t the decision variable again is only order 
quant i ty Q. {x, Q, K, R)] is independent of bo th the str ike quant i ty K 
and the str ike price R. Thus, we can conclude the unnecessariness of maxi-
miz ing the expected prof i t th rough the strike price R. W h a t most impor tant 
is t ha t R)] is ident ical to eqn. (4.1), i.e., 
_E[n、工,0, K, R)] = ElW'ix, Q, R)] = E[U{x, Q)]. (4.4) 
Therefore, the opt imal order quant i ty keeps unchanged f rom tha t of the 
classical newsvendor. The opt imal order quant i ty is determined as follow: 
聰 二 " ^ ， 
S — V + 0 
K* = arb i t rary value in [0, Q* . 
To summarize the above analysis, we have: 
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P ropo s i t i o n 1 The newsvendor's expected profit is unchanged between with 
and without options. 
Propos i t i o n 2 Suppose the option price p{K, R) = (R-v) /。冗{K - x ) f { x ) d x . 
Optimal order quantity (that maximizes the expected profit with options) is 
the same as that in the standard newsvendor model without options. 
Proposi t ion I can be explained as follows: what the newsvendor pays for 
the options are what she expects to be compensated f rom the opt ion wr i ter . 
The result demonstrates that when to seek the objective of maximiz ing the 
expected prof i t , the opt ion w i t h such pr ic ing mechanism w i l l not improve 
the newsvendor's expected profi t . Th is is an evidence of the l im i ta t ion for 
decision maker to consider Object ive I only. 
However, the opt ion does change the r isk profile of the newsvendor. Con-
sider the Figure 4.1, in which the horizontal axis represents the actual de-
mand and the vert ical axis is the actual prof i t to the newsvendor; the dot line 
curves are for prof i t w i thou t the option, whi le the solid line curves are for the 
prof i t w i t h the option. I n the scenario of b = 0, the newsvendor's prof i t is 
downward-proof. I n the scenario of 6 > 0, the expected profi t goes down as 
demand increases when x> Q. The options do not hedge the upward risk. 
Definition 1 《 i J o c , Q, K, R) 二 = 0). 
Propos i t i on 3 With the option, the newsvendor can always achieve a min-
imum profit of = (R- v)K + {v - c)Q - p{K,R) when 
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Figure 4.1: Relat ion of prof i t and demand: w i t h opt ion and w i thou t opt ion 
Proposi t ion 3 can protect the newsvendor f rom a negative real prof i t w i t h 
a proper strike price since K > J^ F{x)dx. For the classical newsvendor 
w i thou t the opt ion, i f the demand is extremely low, the prof i t w i l l be a 
negative value Q{v - c). Even in the best case i n a re turn /buy-back contact, 
the defined m i n i m u m expected prof i t is only zero. Notice tha t the newsvendor 
in the classical sett ing can potent ia l ly obta in h igh prof i t t han she can w i t h 
the option. Th is is because she needs to pay for i t i n the w i th -opt ion setting. 
4.3 Summary of the Chapter 
We study a classical objective - maximizat ion of the expected prof i t i n the 
extended newsvendor model w i t h put options. I t turns out to be a surprising 
result tha t the put opt ion has no impact on the newsvendor's expected prof i t , 
regardless of the strike quant i ty or the strike price. Therefore, the opt imal 
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order quant i t y is the same as classical newsvendor problem, only depending 
on the cost and demand parameters. However, the newsvendor's r isk profi le 
does change. W i t h the opt ion, the newsvendor can always achieve at least 
兀工in〔工,Q,K,R) = {R-v)K + {v-c)Q-p{K, R) when the demand is below 
the order quant i ty Q or when b = 0, which is better t han the performance of 
either the classical set t ing or the buy-back policy. 
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Chapter 5 
Objective I I - Maximizing the 
Probability of Achieving A 
Target Profit 
I n th is chapter, we consider the objective to maximize the probabi l i ty of 
achieving a target prof i t level. We have defined such probabi l i ty as Pb and the 
target prof i t as l i t . l i t can be selected according to some desired "aspirat ion" 
level. Again, we w i l l begin w i t h the simpler case w i t h K = Q to gain insight, 
then move on to the two decision variable case K < Q: 
Object ive 11: 
max PslTr^ix, Q, K, R) > H； • 
5.1 Single Decision Variable Case: K 二 Q 
According to the prof i t funct ion eqn. (2.5), relat ion between demand and 
prof i t for the case of K 二 Q can be shown as Figure 5.1. I n the scenario 
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71=^-C)Q2-P(Q2) 
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° Qi(T<s) Q2(T=s) 
Figure 5.1: Re la t ion between demand and prof i t for = Q when R<s 
of R < s, when x < Q, the pro f i t increases as the actua l demand increases 
and reaches a m a x i m u m when x = Q; the pro f i t decreases at the rate wh ich 
depends on the shortage cost value when x > Q. W h i l e i n a special scenario 
of R = s, p ro f i t eqn. (2.5) becomes: 
ttLJLQ,丑）二 { (5.1) 
— [{s-c + h)Q-hx-p{K,R) i f X > 0 ; 
where R) is defined by eqn. (2.4). 
The actua l prof i t stays equably when x < Q. Therefore, we consider 
di f ferent shortage cost si tuat ions and d is t inguish t h e m in to four cases. 
• Case 1\ R < s and 6 > 0; 
• Case 2.. R 二 s and b > 0] 
• Case 3: R < s and 6 = 0; 
• Case 4: 二 s and 6 = 0. 
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Figure 5.2: Re la t ion between demand and pro f i t for = Q 
Definition 2 《 J o e , Q, K, R) = = Q). 
See Figure 5.2, i n a l l the four cases, i f Ut > 7r;LrO，Q，K, R), t hen 
Thus, on ly consider the 
next scenario; Yl^  ^ 兀maaX工,Q, K , R ) • 
Case 1: R < s and b> 0 
Accord ing to Figure 5.2, we define the intersections of the target prof i t curve 
and the actua l prof i t curve: the upper bound of the demand as x u and the 
lower bound of the demand as XL- On ly when the actua l demand x falls i n 
the in terval of [XL, XU] can the prof i t be larger t han the target prof i t 11 :^ 
PBO^ > NO = PB{XL < X < X U ) = F(XU) — F{XL)- (5.2) 
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Since: 
{s-R)x^Q{R-c)-p{K, R) iix<Q; 
rit = < 
[ { s - c ^ b ) Q - b x - p { K , R ) i f X > Q; 
we have: 
工 L s — R ， 
( s-c + b ) Q - p ( K , R ) - n , 
Xu —— ^ • l。-4J 
Taking the first order derivative yields: 
dPs 、 dxu 厂 , ,、 d x L 
f{x)dx 
二 f(工u) 1 
二 n 恥 少 - c 命 广 糊 
- / ( 处 严 — • ( ⑵ f (丑—c) (5.5) 
S — i t 
综 二 ⑷ ( … 只 - • ( ⑵ — 舰 Q ) 
dQ"^ 0 
- 八 严 — ” ) 嘲 厂 ⑷ ( I 舰 ⑵ 
S — -TL 
= f { . u ) (s — c + … - f — 侧 - ( R - v)fiQ) [ / ( . . ) + / ⑷] 
- 制 ( L — T ) 广 c) (5.6) 
The sign of ^ ^ depends on the demand distr ibut ion. We are not able to 
yield the general analytical opt imal solution wi thout specifying the demand 
pattern. Thus determining the value of Q** requires iterative procedure 
which can be accomplished w i t h computing softwares. 
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Case 2: R = s and b> 0 
I n Case 2, there is no lower bound xl but only upper bound xu demand. 
According to eqn. (5.1): 
n^ 二（s —c)Q — — ( 3 ) + — 均 ； 
PBITCK •^IH) 二 PB{X < Xu) = F{xu)] 
dPs 、dxu 
w 二 剩 . w 
{ s - c - ^ b ) - { s - v ) J ^ f{x)dx 
= f (工 U) ^ 
二制(…命广侧 (5.7) 
Let t ing 醫 = 0 , 
or 
f{xu) 二 0. 
Then solutions are: 
* I f 0 - c + 6 ) < ( s -v)， 
= = + \ (5.8) 
s — V 
* else Q** = K** = oo. 
When cost parameters satisfying the relation of (s - c + 6) < (s - ” ) , the 
satisfatory order quant i ty to maximize PB w i l l be K** 二 Q** 二 
which is greater than the classical opt imal order quant i ty Q* 二 
The difference of Q* and Q** depends on the value of shortage cost (goodwil l 
lost cost). Larger the shortage cost bigger the difference. 
When (s - c + b) > (s - v), i.e., (c - b) < v, the opt imal solution in 
theory is to order infinity. Whi le in real-world applications K** 二 Q** = oo 
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means to order sufficient quant i ty in order not to miss any demand. This 
might occur i f (1) b > c, the shortage cost is bigger than the purchase cost, 
and (2) c > 6 but v is large enough. I n the f irst situation, any unsatisfied 
demand means missing prof i t , which w i l l lower the probabi l i ty to achieve the 
target prof i t level. I n the second, the newsvendor tries to cover al l possible 
demands, or order as many as he can afford since the products w i l l not 
depreciate much. (But in the assumption of newsvendor model, products are 
depreciated quickly after the selling season!). I f the product has such cost 
and demand characteristics, the decision maker can use other objective, such 
as P(2 ) of maximiz ing the profi t subjective to a given probabi l i ty of i t being 
achieved. 
Case 3: R < s and b 二 0 
I n Case 3，there is no upper bound demand ocu but only lower bound ool. 
Using the same t r ick as before, we have: 
Ut = x-h Q{R -c) -p; 
> n o = > ^L) = 1 - J^(^L)； 
t = - ⑷ . ' 奇 
二 _ 八工。 ^ I T r 
二 制 ( 丑 - 。 ) - ( 〜 - • ) . (5.9) 
S — JrC 
Let t ing ^ = 0 , yields: 
• I f R〉coi R<v, 
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R < s 5 > 0 Satisfying solution can be searched and depends on 
cost and demand parameters, 
b = 0 K** = 0 * * = F - i ( l E f ) or K** = Q** = oo 
R = s b>0 K** = Q** = F-i (尝)or K** = Q** = oo 
6 = 0 K** = Q** 二arbitaiy value i n [0, oo) 
Table 5.1: A summary of the solutions for max im iz ing PB when K = Q 
•else 
Q** = K** = oo. 
The newsvendor chooses to increase her order as the str ike price increases 
when R > c or R < V. Otherwise, the newsvendor's o p t i m a l solut ion again 
is t o order enough quan t i t y t o cover any possible demands. 
Case 4: R = s and b = 0 
> no = 1; 
Q** = K** = a rb i ta ry value i n [0,oo). 
Case 4 is a special case wh ich i ts prof i t curve is a level l ine. Whenever 
l i t < TT, the object ive can be achieved w i thou t exception. I n reality, such 
retai ler is commissioned to sell products only, bu t never need to worry about 
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Figure 5.3: Relat ion between demand and prof i t ioi K < Q 
5.2 Two Decision Variable Case: K <Q 
Accord ing to prof i t eqn. (2.6), the relat ion between prof i t and demand when 
K < Q showed in Figure 5.3. We plot two sets of curves for the general 
case 6 > 0. The dot l ine curves represent the prof i t w i t h a decision of K i 
and Q i , whi le the solid l ine curves is the actual prof i t under another set 
of decision of K2 and Q2. I t can be seen tha t the shapes of prof i t curves 
are similar, except tha t the locations of the two decision variables K and Q 
are unfixed. The analysis of maximizat ion of PB w i l l be very di f f icul t . The 
method i n the previous section for single decision variable can not work since 
we are not able to locate x l and ccu. We w i l l leave i t for the future work. 
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Case I Case I I Case I I I Case I V 
c 10 10 10 10 
s 15 15 15 15 
V 5 5 1 5 
b 5 1 1 1 
II 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
cr 20 20 20 50 
E [ n ] 391.44 411.5 382.75 291.24 
Q* 109 102 95 106 
Q** oo 105 96 113 
Table 5.2: Numerical results of max imiz ing PB 
5.3 Numerical Examples 
I n the fol lowing numerical examples, we study the influence of the cost and 
demand parameters on the probabi l i ty to achieve a target prof i t level. We set 
Q 二 J k^ 二 [0.5,0.8,1.2], and the data of the base case: normal ly d is t r ibuted ^ s[n] L 
demand w i t h p 二 100 and cr 二 20, 二 s 二 15, c = 10，i； = 6 二 5 in our 
examples. Table 5.2 shows the values of parameters and the example results 
of four cases. 
參 Case I: Base case; 
• Case I I : Lower shortage cost case; 
• Case I I I : Lower shortage cost and lower salvage value case; 
• Case IV : Higher demand var iat ion w i t h lower shortage cost case. 
38 
I n a l l t he four cases, Q** > Q* means t h a t the max im iza t i on of PB 
requires larger order quan t i t y t h a n t h a t of E [ I l ] . Except of Case I when the 
re la t ion of costs satisfies (s - c + 6) = (s - v ) , we can get un ique o p t i m a l 
solut ions for o ther three cases. For each f igure corresponding t o each case, 
there is a set of three curves representing three di f ferent target pro f i t level, 
ref lect ing the change of PB on the order quan t i t y when K = Q. Especially, 
i n b o t h Case I I and Case III，we p lo t two figures for each. The lef t is of three 
di f ferent (3 values, the r igh t is the ampl i f i ca tory one when [3 = 1.2. 
I n Case I when (c - h) 二 V, the op t ima l so lut ion to max imize PB is 
i n f i n i t y . For the same order quant i ty , higher PB is achieved for lower target 
pro f i t . See F igure 5.4. 
Case I I differs f r o m Case I I I i n the magn i tude of salvage value v whi le 
b o t h dif fer f r o m Case I i n b. The higher the salvage value the larger the range 
of sat is fy ing order quant i ty . I t ' s easier t o max imize PB for lower shortage 
cost p roduc t when targeted pro f i t level is less t h a n expected prof i t value. B u t 
when p >1, i.e., the target prof i t is set beyond E[Ii\, the object ive tends to 
become max im iza t i on of P b O ^ > TT^丄 a no-solut ion problem. The reason 
is: according t o the figures of Case 3 k Case 4 i n F igure 5.2，the actua l prof i t 
is bounded f r o m below, wh ich increases the p robab i l i t y t o achieve n^. A t the 
same t ime, the difference between E[U^] and tt^^^ becomes very small , e.g., 
i n Case I I I , E[U] = = 382.75 whi le t t二似=394.33 . Th is is why i n our 
case when P = 1.2, PB is extremely low w i t h a m a x i m u m of only 2 x 10"^. 
Not ice t h a t Case I V differs f r om Case I I i n a, wh ich is of higher demand 
var iat ion. T h e m a x i m u m PB is greater t h a n those of Case I I because the 
difference between and vr^工 is more signif icant. 
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Figure 5.4: Relat ion of PB and Q w i t h different target profi ts: Case I 
X 10"® 
P 1-2, ,丨——. 1 p 20 I . ‘ • 1 
B p=0.8 B n 
-• • • p=G.5 
—p=1.2 I 
1 - -f •： ‘ 
/ 15 - -
0.8 - +丨 i -
； I ' ； 10 - -
0.6 - ： 丨 ！ •： -
。.4- i 丨 ： ； _ 5- -
0.2 - I 
； ” ^ ^ 丨 ^ ^ 
0 ^ 
-0.2o 50 100 150 200 ' 00 50 100 150 200 
Order Quantity Q Order Quantity Q ((3=1.2) 
Figure 5.5: Relat ion of PB and Q w i t h different target profits: Case I I 
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Figure 5.6: Relat ion of PB and Q w i t h different target profits: Case I I I 
5.4 Summary of the Chapter 
I n th is chapter, we study the objective of maximiz ing the probabi l i ty of 
achieving a target prof i t . We analyze th is quant i ty decision problem in single 
decision variable case K 二 Q, considering four scenarios of different strike 
prices and shortage costs. Except tha t when < s and 6 > 0, the op t ima l 
solut ion depends on the demand patten, we obta in opt imal solutions for other 
three scenarios. The two decision variable case K < Q very complicated, 
and we leave i t for the future study. We end the chapter w i t h numerical 
analysis, demonstrat ing how the probabi l i ty of achieving different level of 
target prof i t changes along w i t h Q and K. 
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Chapter 6 
Objective I I I - Minimizing 
Profit Variance 
Accord ing to Propos i t ion 1 i n Chapter 4 obtained f r om Object ive I，the op-
t i o n has no effect on the newsvendor's expected prof i t . Therefore, we do not 
choose the commonly used method — mean-variance analysis for evaluat ing 
the r isk- re turn tradeoff , nor we s tudy any expl ic i t u t i l i t y funct ions. We min-
imize the prof i t variance d i rect ly th rough the str ike price R and the str ike 
quant i t y K , respectively. Accord ing to Case 2 and Case 4 i n Figure 5.2, 
when R 二 s, the newsvendor's prof i t stays constant i f the actual demand 
is less t han the order quant i ty . Thus the newsvendor's prof i t variance w i l l 
decrease. We s tudy th is spacial case R = s where the op t ion has r isk-proof 
u t i l i t y to the newsvendor. 
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6.1 Min im iz ing Profit Variance through R 
We are interested in the prof i t variance under different strike prices. Bu t 
wha t the strike price should the newsvendor accept? I n order to s impl i fy our 
research, we begin w i t h the case K = Q. 
Case: K 二 Q 
This problem can be stated as: 
m i n Var[U^{x,Q,R)], 
R 
s — c-{-b 
where F(Q) = 
\ , s -V -^h 
Propos i t i o n 4 The profit variance Var\U.^] is convex m the strike price R 
for any strike quantity K in the interval [0, Q . 
Proof. 
Rewri te eqn. (2.5) as: 
^ R{Q-X)^-{SX-CQ)-V[K,R) iix<Q-
[ { s - c + h)Q-hx-p{K,R) i i x > Q . 
Since: 
V a r [ i i ] = 对 n2] — 
and 
— m — = 0, 
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we have, 
dVar[U^{x,Q,R)] = d E j U ' ' R ) f ] d E ^ l W " R ) ] = ^ d l W " R ) ] ' 
M = M M — OR • 
Let : 
[ i f x > Q . 
Then, 
= R\Q - xf + 2R{Q - x){sx - Qc) + (i? - v f l \ K ) + (sx - Qcf 
-2R(Q - x){R - v ) I { K ) — 2{sx - Qc){R — v ) I { K ) , 
• f ( 工 , 二 - x)^ + 2 ( 0 - - Qc) + 2{R - v ) l \ K ) 
OR 
-2{Q - x){R - v ) I { K ) — 2R{Q — x ) I { K ) - 2(5x - Qc)I{K) 
=2{Q - x)[R{Q - x ) + (sx — Qc) - { R - v)I{K)] 
+2I{K)[{R v ) I { K ) — R{Q - x ) - [sx 一 Qc)] 
二 2 ( Q - x ) 7 r i - 2 / ( i ^ ) 7 r i ； 
一2[(s -c + b)Q- bx]{R - v ) I { K ) , 
OR 
二 —("5 —c +的Q — M 
二 — 2 /⑷兀 2 . 
T h a t is: 
^ f 2 ( 0 - x - 0 , R ) i f x < Q； 
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二 r 2[Q - X - m f - ^ ^ ^ \ix<Q-
^ 二 I i f x > Q ; 
— ‘ 2 [ { Q - x ) - I { K ) f iix<Q-
\ 2P{K) i i x > Q . 
Therefore, 
= E 雨 
pQ /•⑷ 
二 / 2 [ { Q - x ) - I i K ) f f { x ) d x + / 2 l \ K ) f { x ) d x > 0. 
Jo JQ 
Case: K <Q 
Following the same calculation process as the previous section, we can yield 
that : 
二 广 妙 一 卜 I { K ) f f { x ) d x + 「 2 l \ K ) f ( x ) d x > 0. 
dR2 Jo JK 
• 
Thus we finish the proof that Var\U.^{x, Q, K, R)] is convex in R as long 
8,8 K < Q. The opt imal strike price R* to minimize the profi t variance can 
be obtained by solving 一 … ] = 0 . 
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Opt ima l Solut ion i?* 
B y solving = • we can obta in the op t ima l str ike price to 
min imize the prof i t variance i n the case of K = Q. 
M 
= — 丽 ⑷ 
二 [Q 2R[{Q - x ) - I { K ) Y f { x ) d x + r 2l\K)Rf{x)dx 
Jo JQ 
+ 广 { 2 ( Q - x){sx — Qc) + 2 I { K ) [ - v I { K ) + v(Q - x) - {sx - Qc)]}f{x)dx 
Jo 
- 厂 2I{K)[{s -c + b)Q-bx + v I { K ) ] f { x ) d x 
JQ 
= 0 . 
Therefore, 
i T 二 W (6.1) 
C + D 、 
where 
A = [Q {{Q - x){sx — Qc) + I { K ) [ v { Q - X - I { K ) ) — {sx — Qc)]}f{x)dx; 
Jo 
B = - r I { K ) [{s-c + b)Q - + v I { K ) ] f { x ) d x ; 
JQ 





Numer ica l Examples 
We consider a few numerical examples. The condi t ion of the base case is 
the same as tha t i n Chapter 5. Various cost and demand parameters w i t h 
corresponding analysis results are i l lust rated in Table 6.1. 
X 1 0 " 
4.51 - r 1 1 1 1 1 “ I 
i 25- \ _ \ : 
。5 
n l 1 L I 1 1 1 1 
0 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15 17.5 20 
Strike Price T 
Figure 6.1: Relat ion of R and Var[U^] of Case I 
We compare the minimized variance wi th : (1) Var[Il\, i.e., R = 0, 
( 2 ) y a r [ n g ^ J , in the fol lowing six cases: 
參Ca se I: Base case; 
• C a se I I : Lower goodwi l l lose cost case; 
• C a se I I I : Lower bo th goodwil l lose cost and salvage value case; 
• C a se IV : Higher demand var iat ion case; 
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Case I Case II Case III Case IV Case V Case VI 
c 10 10 10 10 10 10 
s 15 15 15 15 15 15 
V 5 5 1 5 5 5 
b 5 1 1 5 10 5 
H 100 100 100 100 100 100 
o 20 20 20 50 20 120 
coeff. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.2 
R* 13.63 14.45 14.59 13.65 13.04 11.19 
E[IL] 391 412 383 236 374 136 
Var[Il]1.76 x 104 1.44x10^ 1.78x10^ Q.eSxlO^ 2.07x10^ 2.78x10^ 
Var[n^(i^ *)] 1.44x103 93.03 143.83 9.65x103 4.14 x 10^  5.07x10^  
-Var[ng二J 1-88 x 10^ 112.3 176.46 H22 x 10^ 5.02 x 10^ 6.87 x 10^ 
Table 6.1: Numer ica l results of m in im iz ing pro f i t variance th rough R 
• C a se V : Higher salvage value case; 
• C a se V I : Ex t reme h igh demand var ia t ion case.i 
We use the classical newsvendor'r prof i t variance as a benchmark to show 
the improvement t ha t the op t ion has brought. A n d f rom Figure 5.2，we've 
learned t h a t t t ^ keeps unchanged when X < Q if R = s. Obviously, the 
prof i t variance is reduced because of the s ta t ion of the actual prof i t . We 
analyze th is special case to compare i t w i t h our op t ima l s i tuat ion. 
The convexity proper ty we discussed previously can be seen in tu i t ive ly 
f r om Figure 6.1 for Case 1. We increase the str ike price R f rom 0 to 18, a 
value greater t h a n the sell ing price 15 i n order t o see the change of the prof i t 
4During the numerical analysis, we assume the generated value for the demand are 
truncated at zero. 
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variance more clearly. F rom the results in Table 6.1, given cost and demand 
parameters, we can always min imize the prof i t variance th rough choosing a 
proper str ike price. A n d i t w i l l no t have any negative effects on the expected 
pro f i t . 
For the prof i t variance, i n Case II，when shor tage/goodwi l l loss is lower 
at 6 = 1, i f newsvendor can negotiate a str ike price t o as h igh as R* 二 14.59 
(qui te close to the sell ing price s = 15), then she can min imize the prof i t 
variance to as low as 93.03, on ly 0.6% of the classical newsvendor's. I n 
other cases, the prof i t variances i n our model are not higher t h a n 25% of the 
classical newsvendor's. 
Not ice t ha t Case I differs f r o m Case I I and Case V i n b. For the op t ima l 
str ike price i t goes up when the shortage cost declines, and visa versa. I n 
Case I I I of smaller salvage value, the op t ima l str ike price tu rns t o be smaller, 
since the op t ion price depends on { R - v ) . Case I , I V and V I show tha t the 
op t ima l str ike price decreases when demand f luc tuat ion increases since larger 
demand variance w i l l increase the op t ion price. 
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6.2 Min im iz ing Profit Variance through K 
I f t he op t i on wr i t e r w i l l no t al low the newsvendor t o negot iate the st r ike 
pr ice b u t the str ike quant i ty . T h e n the str ike quan t i t y is the on ly decision 
var iable. Consider the effect of K on the pro f i t variance. 
m i n 
K 
s — c + b 
where F(Q)— —. 
、， s -V -\-b 
P r o p o s i t i o n 5 The profit variance Var\U.^] is quasi-convex in K. The op-
timal strike quantity can be uniquely determined by solving 抓 一 M,K,R)] 二 
0. 
Proof 
Rewr i te the prof i t eqn. (2.6) as: 
‘ { s - R)x + {v- c)Q + v)K - p{K, R) if x < K-
二 < {s-v)x + { v - c ) Q - p { K , R) i i K < x < Q ] 
、-bx + {s-c + b)Q-p{K, R) i f x > Q ] 
‘ i f X < K ; 
二 < n泛(x,Q,K,R) i f K < x < Q ; 
、 T T 登 i f x > Q . 
To s impl i fy the expression, we use Tr f , Tr f , v r f t o s tand for 7rf(x, Q, K, R), 
and t t ^ K , R). 
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[Tr fp = [(5 - R)x + - c)Q]' - 2p{K, R)[{s - R)x + {y - c)Q] 
R){R - vfK^ - 2p{K, R){R — v)K 
+ 2 ( i ? — v)K[{s - R)x + {v- c)Q]; 
[TT^f = [(s - v)x c)Q]^ - 2p{K, R)[{s - v)x -h (v - c)Q]^ +p{K, Rf-
[K^f = H x r + G s - c + 6)Q]2 — 2 p ( K , i Q [ — k c + Gs — c + 6 ) Q ] + K i ^， ^ 2 -
• 汁 二 -2iR - v)F[K)[{s - R)x c)Q] + 2{R - v f l { K ) F { K ) 
OK 
+2K{R - vf — 2{R 一 vfF{K)K — 2{R — v f l { K ) 
— - R)x + 0 — c)Q' 
二 —2{R 一 v)F{K)[{s — R)x ^{v- c)Q + (i? — v)K - { R - v)I{K)] 
+2{R — — R)x + {v- c)Q + v)K - { R - v)I{K)]-
叩 二 - v)F{K)[{s - + (i； - c)Q] + +2{R - v f l { K ) F { K ) 
dK 
二 -2[R - v)F{K)[{s — v)x + (” - c)Q - { R - v)I{K)\] 
浏:【” 二 —2(i? — ”) i^( i^^[—6:i ; + Gs — c + 6 ) Q ] + 2 ( i ? - ” ) 2 / ( i ^ ) F ( i ^ 0 
二 -2{R - v)F{K)[-hx + (s — c + 6)Q - (i? — v)I{K). 
Combin ing and s imp l i f y ing the above expressions yields: 
‘ i f x < K-, 
^ r 2 
^ ^ ^ = -2{R — V)F{K)7T^ if K<X<Q; (6-2) 
、-2{R - v)F{K)T:^ i i x > Q . 
Since: 
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姬丨 I F l— 妒严丨 I F ] 
•^^―2五[nj 服—U . 
dVarjU''] = £；浏TT吁 _ 二 • 吁 3) 
M 二 dK — OK 、’） 
Subst i tut ing eqn. (6.2) in to eqn. (6.3) yields: 
胁 們 = - 2 ( R - v)F(K)Fln''] + 2(R — v)E[U^]. (6 .4) 
dK 
Taking second order derivative of eqn. (6.2) gets: 
‘-2{R — v)f{K)7T^ 一 2(R — v)[F{K) - 1 ] 键 if x < K-, 
二 -2{R — v ) f 嘛 — 2 { R — v ) F { K f - ^ i i K < x < Q -
-2{R — v)f{K)7r^ — 2{R 一 v)F{K)盛 if x > Q; 
then the second order derivative of Var[Il^] is: 
a V a r p ^ ] 二 a2[7r 吓 
二 dK^ 
加K 
二 -2{R - v ) f { K ) E [ I i ^ ] + 2{R - v ) E [ - ^ ] 
二 -2(R — v){f{K)E[U^] — (6 .5) 
Since: 
Epf] 二 r [(s — R)x + (V - c)Q ^{R- v)K - { R - v)I{K)]f{x)dx 
Jo 
二（s — R)KF{K) — (s - R)I(K) + (v- c)QF{K) 
-{R 一 v)I{K)F{K) + {R- v)KF{K)-
F[nKl , 、 … ( s - R)I{K) 
靜 二 ^s-v)K-^{v-c)Q-{R-v)I{K)-^ F(“; 
< (s- v)K + (u — c)K - (s — R)I{K) - { R - v ) I { K ) 
= s [ I { K ) [vI{K) - cK] 
< 0. 
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Le t t i ng 
dVar^''] = - 2 (双 一 + 2(R - v)E[U^] = 0; 
we have: 
= { R - v ) F ( K ) F { K ) > 0; (6.7) 
We can then conclude by eqn. (6.5), (6.6) & (6.7) that : 
二帶侧驛-五[禁]}〉0. 
Therefore, Var[Il^] is quasi-convex in K. 
• 
6.2.1 Special Case R 二 s 
Since Var[UK{x,Q,K, R)] is only quasi-convex in K, the analysis of jo int 
convexity of R and K w i l l be very diff icult. We wi l l leave i t for the future 
work. Alternatively, we are interested in the case when R = s. 
We assume the selling season is short and selling price w i l l not fluctuate 
much dur ing this period. I t 's straightforward for the newsvendor to assume 
that she w i l l sell out all the products at the market selling price. I t 's reason-
able and acceptable if the opt ion wri ter offers a strike price which is exactly 
the same as the selling price, i.e., R 二 s. Moreover, we have confirmed the 
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the actual prof i t is bounded at the max imum prof i t value tt^工 when x <Q. 
Therefore, th is special case is of our interest. 
Based on the prof i t variance's quasi-convexity property on K. We study 
the risk-averse newsvendor's purchasing pol icy for the options when R 二 s. 
Suppose the newsvendor orders Q units products which satisfies F{Q)= 
to maximize the expected prof i t . The strike quant i ty thus is the only 
decision variable. The problem can be formulated as: 
m i n R)]-
K 
” … 、 5 - C + 6 
where F{U)= 
乂 7 s — V -\-h 
R = s. 
Optimal Solution K* 
The opt imal strike quant i ty K* tha t minimize the prof i t variance is given by: 
E[{K* - x ) - ] 二 (6.8) 
^ (s - v) 
or 
E[{x - = (6.9) 
L\ (s — v) 
where 
G 二 — ( s - i ; + 6)(3Pro6(a;〉Q) + ( s - i ; + 6)£;[a::U>Q: 
poo 
二 —” +购巧Q) + (s —” + 6) / xf{x)dx 
JQ 
二 - ( s - ” + h)QF{Q) + (5 - ^ + H){E[X] — QF{Q) + RQ} 
fQ 




When R 二 s, the prof i t funct ion is: 
, ( s - c)K + { v - c ) { Q - K ) - p{K, R) if x < K; 
Q, K,R) = l (s — c)x ^ {v - c){Q - x) - p{K, R) if K < x < Q; 
、{s-c)Q-b{x-Q)-p{K,R) ifx>Q. 
Rewrite eqn. (6.10) to be: 
where 
(v - c)Q + 0 - v)max{K, x) i f x < Q; 
\ (s - c ) 0 - b(x - 0 ) i f x > Q ; 
= [{s - v)Q - b{x - Q)]U>Q； 
R) = [(i; - c)Q + (s - v)max{K, X)%<Q. 
Therefore, we have: 
Var[7r^] 二 l ^ a r . J 二 l ^ a r [ n f i + TifJ; 
y a r p L J 二 T/ar[nfi]+l/ar[nf2] + Cm;(7rfi，7rf2) 
二 V^arpfi] + Var[U^,] + — ^ [ n f j ^ p f j } 
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Compute the first order derivative of the prof i t variance: 
— = ()• 
dK ， 
M ^ = dK dK 
dVar[U^] d _ 。p[nK]犯吨] 
=2E[UUs - v)U<k] - - v)U<K 
二 2丑{[0 c)Q + (5 - v)max{K, x)](s V)U<K} 
- 2 ( s v)Prob{x < K )丑 [ n g = J 
二 2(5 — v)Prob{x < K){{v c)Q + (s - v)K —別ng二J} 
= 2 ( 5 一 v)F{K){{v 一 c)Q + ( 5 - v)K - 五 ( 6 . 1 0 ) 
Notice that : 
对 n f j = (v - c)QProb{x <Q) + {s- v){KProb{x < K) + E[X1K<X<Q]} 
- c + h)QProh{x >Q)- hE[xl^yQ 
二（” — c)QProb{x <(3) + (s-c + b)Prob{x > Q)Q — 
(s — v){KProb(x < K) + E[X1K<X] — 
二 （” - + (s - 7； + h)QProh{x >Q)-{s-v + h)E[xUyQ_ 
+ ( s - v){KProh{x < K ) ^ E[XIK<X]}- (6.11) 
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Let t ing 抓 ： 贫 J = 0 yields: 
抓 = ( … 斜 - 於 五 [ n L J 
= - { s - v ^ b)QProb{x >Q) + {s-v-\- b)E[xl^yQ 
+ ( s - v){K — K[1 - Proh{x > K)] — E[X1K<X]} 
二 G + (s - v){KProb{x > K ) - E[X1K<X]} = 0. 
• 
Notice tha t 二 2 { s - v ) F { K ) { { v - c ) Q ^ { s - v ) K i s a 
increasing funct ion of K . Whether 抓 % [》」二 0 depends on the d is t r ibut ion 
funct ion and the parameters. 
• I f G 二（s — 1； + b)[E{x) — Q + / ( f F{x)dx] > 0, then opt imal strike 
quant i ty K"" can be solved f rom eqn. (6.9). Given a demand dist r ibut ion 
and cost parameters, using computing software, such as Matlab, to search 
for the opt imal solution wi l l not be dif f icult . 
For instant, suppose the demand follows a normal distr ibut ion w i t h mean 
12 and variance cr. Using the method proposed by Lau (1980a) in eqn. (3.2)， 
we have: 
noo 
E[{x - KT] 二 / - K*)f{x)dx 
JK* 
二 厂工脚工-[xf{x)dx - [ K*f{x)dx 
Jo Jo — JK* 
=IJ^— [-af{z) + ^F{z)] - K*FiK*) 
二（ 7 / ⑷ + … z ) - i r F ( i r ) , 
where z 二 (冗：一“)and / ( . ) and F(.) are density function and c.d.f, respec-
tively, of the standard normal variate. 
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We can then use Matlab to search for K* tha t satisfies: 
• Otherwise, there is no way to achieve 抓"盟贫=」=0, the upper bound 
value of K, K* = Q* w i l l be opt imal solution. 
Numer ica l Examples 
The prof i t variance is quasi-convex in strike quant i ty K. Using the same set 
of data of base case as previous examples, we study the effects of various 
cost and demand d is t r ibut ion parameters to the prof i t variance. Numerical 
analysis results of six cases are listed in Table 6.2 for three scenarios of 
different strike prices: 1) R = 0, i.e., the classical newsvendor model; 2) 
R 二 z) R 二 8. We would like to compare the reductions of the profit 
variance by specifying the strike price at several different "unique" values. 
According to the examples in previous section of min imiz ing profit vari-
ance through R, the opt imal strike price is always between [c, s]. I n all the 
five cases: 
yar[n^]« Far[n], 
Var[U^\R 二 s)] < Var[U^*{R = c)] < Var[U]. 
I n Figures 6.2 to 6.4, the value of the strike quant i ty K is increased 
f rom 0 to Q*, we can see the quasi-convexity property of Var[U^] and the 
opt imal strike quant i ty K* is achieved at around Q*. The opt ion performs 
the distinct reduction in the profit variance by increasing the strike quanti ty 
t i l l the opt imal value, especially in Case I I when the shortage cost is very low 
and demand variat ion is not very large. Minimized prof i t variance in best 
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Case I Case II Case II I Case IV Case V Case VI 
c 10 10 10 10 10 10 
s 15 15 15 15 15 15 
V 5 5 1 5 5 5 
b 5 1 1 5 10 5 
^ 100 100 100 100 100 100 
o- 20 20 20 50 20 120 
coeff. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.2 
^ ^ 4 1 2 383 236 ^ 136 
Var[Il] 1.76 x 10^  1.44 x 10^  1.78 x 10^  9.68 x 10^  2.07 x 10^  2.78 x 10^  
Var[Il''\R = c)] 4.35 x 10^  3.45 x 10^  1.99 x 10^  2.49 x 10^  6.48 x 10^  7.78 x 10^  
1.05 x 10^ 66.2 104.4 6.62 x 10^ 2.93 x 10^ 3.99 x 10^ 
Table 6.2: Numer ica l results of m in im iz ing prof i t variance th rough K 
s i tua t ion is on ly 0 . 6 % of the prof i t variance of the classical model. Case V I 
wh ich is the lease favorable case when the demand exhibi ts h igh uncertainty, 
i t can s t i l l reduce the variance by 72%, i.e., 一 二 二 0.72. Th is 
par t icu la r ly benefits a newsvendor who can' t bear h igh prof i t r isk. 
6.3 Summary of the Chapter 
I n th is chapter, we s tudy the impact of the pu t op t ion on the newsvendor's 
r isk profi le. The nesvendor's prof i t variance is convex/quasi-convex in the 
str ike pr ice/st r ike quant i ty . We consider th is pr ic ing and quant i t y decision 
op t im iza t ion prob lem under the object ive to min imize the prof i t variance 
directly，while keeping the expected prof i t at the same level as the classical 
newsvendor model. We derive the closed-form expression of op t ima l str ike 
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Figure 6.4: Relat ion of K and Var[U^]: Case V I 
price R for single decision variable case K 二 Q, and the analyt ical opt imal 
solut ion of str ike quant i ty K given R 二 s. Analysis of the numerical examples 
demonstrates tha t : l ) I n the lease favorable example we've studied, the opt ion 
can reduce the prof i t variance by 72% (Case V I i n Section 6.2), and the best 
is 99.5%; 2) R* decreases as the demand uncertainty increases for a normal ly 
d is t r ibuted demand; 3) The opt ion performs the best i n t e rm of reducing the 




I n th is thesis we introduce a pu t opt ion in to the newsvendor sett ing, and 
investigate the value of the opt ion f rom the newsvendor's perspectives. Real-
wor ld applications, such as Enron's, jus t i f y the existence of the potent ia l r isk-
neut ra l op t ion wr i te r i n our model. The "newsvendor" we discussed is one of 
those small f i rms / reta i lers who are facing short product l ife cycles and h igh 
product varieties, are sensitive to the prof i t variance thus are more r isk averse 
than the larger, wel l diversified f i rms or chain/ integrated retailers. Using the 
classical newsvendor model as a framework, we study three objectives to such 
a k i nd of newsvendor: 
• O b jective I : Max im iz ing the expected prof i t by opt imal ly determining 
the order the quant i ty and the strike quant i ty ; 
• O b jective I I : Max imiz ing the probabi l i ty of achieving a target prof i t by 
opt imal ly deciding the order quant i ty and the strike quant i ty ; 
• O b jective I I I : M in im iz ing the prof i t variance by opt imal ly choosing the 
strike quant i ty and the strike price, while mainta in ing the expected 
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prof i t at the same level as i n the classical newsvendor model. 
The pu t op t ion is s imi lar t o the re tu rn /buy-back pol icy wh ich is widely 
used i n several industr ies and intensively studied in the l i terature of supply 
chain coordinat ion, bu t they serve different purposes. A re tu rn pol icy is a 
supply chain coord inat ion mechanism to maximize the channel j o in t prof i ts, 
whi le our op t ion ma in ly benefits the newsvendor i n the r isk profi le. Current 
l i teratures have not discussed Object ive I I I , wh ich is more general and not 
l im i t ed by any expl ic i t u t i l i t y funct ions. The ma in f indings are: 
• T h e op t ion has no impact on the newsvendor's expected prof i t regard-
less of the str ike quant i ty or the str ike price. The reason for th is unique 
proposi t ion is tha t what the newsvendor pays for the options equals 
what she expects to be pa id back by the opt ion wr i ter . However, we 
find tha t the newsvendor's r isk profi le does change w i t h th is opt ion. 
• W e have the op t ima l solutions to maximize the probabi l i ty of achieving 
a target prof i t vary for different strike prices R and shortage costs b 
i n the single decision variable case K = Q. Generally, the op t ima l 
solut ion is unique. 
• T h e prof i t variance is convex /quasi-convex in the str ike pr ice/str ike 
quant i ty, respectively. We derive the closed-form expression of the op-
t ima l strike price tha t minimizes the prof i t variance when K 二 Q. We 
also y ie ld the analyt ical solut ion to min imize prof i t variance through 
opt imal ly choosing strike quant i ty when R = s. Thus the newsvendor 
can reduce the r isk w i thou t compromising the expected prof i t . 
• N u m e r ical examples reveal the fol lowing, maybe useful insights. 
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— F o r low shortage cost p roduc t , R* is the highest among al l the 
s i tuat ions given K = Q. T h e o p t i o n can s igni f icant ly reduce the 
p ro f i t variance, e.g., i n some cases, the percentage of reduct ion can 
be 99% as compared w i t h the variance i n the classical newsvendor 
mode l w i t h o u t the pu t opt ion. 
一 T h e pro f i t variance is more sensitive t o the str ike quan t i t y t h a n 
the str ike price. For example, i n case I V , the o p t i m a l str ike price 
can achieve a 90% of reduct ion, wh i le the o p t i m a l str ike quan t i t y 
w i t h R = s can b r ing a 93% reduct ion. 
F ina l ly , we wou ld l ike t o po in t out the l im i ta t i ons of our research. F igure 
7.1 shows w h a t we have accomplished (marked w i t h a A ) , w h a t is not nec-
essary t o s tudy (marked w i t h a / ) , and wha t w i l l be achieved i n the fu ture 
work ( lef t i t b lanked). F i rs t , the case K < Q has no t been fu l l y resolved and 
Variable Objective I Objective II Objective III 
K A A 
Q A A / 
R / A 
K & R / L _ _ _ = J = = 
Table 7.1： F in ished work k fu tu re work 
the str ike price hasn' t been considered as a decision variable under Object ive 
I I . Second, the j o in t convexity of the prof i t variance in str ike quant i ty K 
and str ike price R has not yet been explored. Besides, to incorporate the 
r isk-aversion th rough u t i l i t y funct ion in to our model w i l l also be a di rect ion 
of fu ture work. 
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